One of the most important potential benefits from the process of international financial integration is the opportunity it offers for diversification of macroeconomic risks internationally. In turn, the crossborder diversification of portfolio holdings is widely considered to be the major driving force behind this process. The present paper offers a complement to this literature. It identifies workers' remittance flows to developing countries as an important channel through which the process of international risk-sharing might take place. Using a panel dataset that includes most developing countries during the period 1990-2000, this study demonstrates that countries which receive above-average levels of workers' remittances achieve higher degrees of international risk-sharing in consumption. Moreover, this effect is not uniform across different groups of developing countries, being the strongest in transition economies.
Introduction
The process of international financial integration, which accelerated in the past two decades, can potentially bring numerous benefits to the world economy. One of the central benefits it offers to the residents of different countries is the possibility to diversify their macroeconomic risks internationally. Therefore, through the process of cross-border trade in assets, these countries can relax the link between domestic output growth and domestic consumption (income) growth up to the point when the latter will depend exclusively on the "world" output growth 1 . This process, through which country-specific risks are diversified away across national borders, is known as international risk-sharing. Moreover, the finance literature usually associates it with the underlying trade in financial assets. Therefore, investment in an internationally-diversified portfolio is identified as the major channel through which the process of international risk-sharing takes place. Similarly, the deviation from the hypothesis of "perfect" or complete risk-sharing is associated with the tendency by investors to "over-invest" in domestic assets and thereby forego many diversification opportunities available through investment in foreign assets. This latter phenomenon is also known in the finance literature as "home equity (or bond) bias". Since the bias in investment strategies seems to be the most obvious reason for the deviation from complete risk-sharing, many empirical studies investigate the relationship between the two.
Though the association between the two phenomena is very clear for the group of advanced economies, it might not be as important for the developing world. Therefore, this paper concentrates on an alternative channel through 1 Since this world output growth is the same for all countries, it implies that in the end all countries' consumption growth rates will be equalized.
which one country can smooth consumption and diversify its idiosyncratic risks internationally. In particular, the focus in this empirical study is on workers' remittance flows to developing countries. The main objective is to find out what role workers' remittances play in international risk-sharing. Do countries that receive above average levels of remittance inflows achieve a significantly higher level of international risk-sharing?
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief literature review on some important studies on international risk-sharing and workers' remittances, respectively. It is followed by section 3 that deals with data issues, and section 4 which puts forward the empirical strategy.
The estimation results are presented in section 5. Finally, section 6 gives some concluding remarks and suggestions for further research.
Literature Review

International Risk-Sharing
International portfolio diversification and international risk-sharing are closely interrelated, but by no means equivalent phenomena. The deviations from an internationally diversified portfolio are studied in the finance literature and are known as the "home (equity) bias", while the departures from complete consumption and income smoothing are known in international macroeconomics literature as the "international risk-sharing puzzle". Though these concepts are interrelated, the former does not always imply the latter (nor vice-versa). More concretely, Lewis (1999) argues that "home bias" may not necessarily lead to lower international risk-sharing if most of consumption and income smoothing is done through international borrowing and lending rather than portfolio holdings. Conversely, Baxter and Jermann (1997) show that even complete international diversification of portfolio holdings does not directly imply smooth consumption and income streams.
First, total equity holdings might represent a very small portion of global GDP, and second, they might not provide adequate hedging of returns to human capital.
Since the theoretical literature does not provide an unambiguous answer about the relationship between "equity home bias" and international risksharing, Sorensen et al. (2005) test it empirically using data for the OECD countries during the 1990s. The central issue that they investigate is whether countries with lower, or decreasing home bias during the period considered, have higher or increasing levels of international risk-sharing as well. They find that lower "home equity bias" indeed leads to more risk-sharing in consumption and income. This effect has an economic meaning as well: a one percentage point decrease in "home bias" leads to almost half of a percentage point increase in risk-sharing.
In an influential paper, Lewis (1999) undertakes a joint investigation of the "equity home bias" as referred to in the finance literature with the "consumption home bias" as discussed in the international macroeconomics literature. Although these two phenomena seem to be influenced by similar factors, they cannot be considered equivalent. Furthermore, she invokes the fallacy in the "casual intuition" that home bias in equities and risk-sharing in consumption are necessarily linked with each other. First, equity home bias is not a sufficient condition for consumption home bias. In particular, as long as countries can borrow and lend with each other, consumption growth rates can be perfectly correlated even if domestic residents do not hold foreign equity at all. Second, equity home bias is not a necessary condition for consumption home bias. Because parts of total domestic output cannot be (are not) securitized and traded on the stock markets, perfect international portfolio diversification does not necessarily imply perfect international risk-sharing in consumption.
Workers' Remittances
Workers' remittances to developing countries have been steadily increasing in the past decades (see Figure 1 ). In the mid-1990s they overtook the total of the most stable source of external finance, do not display high levels of procyclicality (see Figure 3) , and jump sharply after an economic (or financial) crisis hits the home recipient country 3 . In fact, these last three characteristics suggest that remittances might contribute to consumption smoothing, and improve the risk-sharing capacity of the recipient economy.
The important role that remittances play in relaxing the external constraints of many developing countries is also acknowledged in Ratha (2003) and remittances intended for investment 4 . Moreover, he argues that the former group should be less volatile than the latter. Additionally, he makes a distinction between different country groups. In particular, he demonstrates that poor countries with lower-than-median and middle income countries with higher-than-median growth rates receive relatively more remittances 5 .
Focusing on the macroeconomic nature of remittances, Buch and Kuckulenz (2004) find that they are mostly driven by market forces, though social and demographic considerations play an increasingly important role as well. There are two types of data used in the construction of the panel dataset:
macroeconomic data and data on workers' remittances. In turn, they come from two different sources: the macroeconomic series are taken from the Penn World Table Version 6 .1 and the data on remittances comes from the IMF Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook 8 . The first group refers to the following series: real consumption per capita and real GDP per capita, both adjusted for PPP, which are standardly used in macroeconomic studies.
For the purposes of this study, I calculate the yearly growth rates of these 6 Due to the large number of missing observations for 14 countries, the final dataset is restricted to 139 countries in total. 7 The classification of developing countries into the first two groups MFIs and LFIs is done by the IMF. The group of transition economies includes the former centrallyplanned economies with the exception of the countries that belong to the Commonwealth Yearbook reports three components that can be used for this purpose: compensation of employees, workers remittances, and migrants' transfers 12 . The first two categories are registered with the current account, while the last category belongs to the capital account of the balance of payments 13 . More precisely, compensation of employees refers to "the wages, salaries, and other benefits earned by individuals for work that they performed in economies in which they are not residents", while workers' remittances "cover cur- 9 The estimation results for different subsamples do not change significantly when "world" growth rates are calculated as unweighed averages of the growth rates for that particular subsample only. for more details on definitions and data-related issues.
12 Some countries, it also includes entries registered under "current private transfers" that refer specifically to remittances. does not give clear guidelines about the choice of the appropriate series.
Second, the distinctions among the three components are small (and one may argue arbitrary), and therefore the probability for misclassification of certain transfers is not negligible. Finally, though large differences exist among the three components, Figure 4 shows that there was an increasing trend in all of them during the past four decades.
An important point to note is that only gross data on remittances inflows has been used in the construction of workers' remittances indicators. There are at least three reasons why gross and not net (inflows minus outflows) might be more appropriate for this analysis. First, workers' remittances constitute an especially important source of external financing for the developing world, where countries are most often only recipients of these funds.
Second, the data on remittance outflows is even more scarce, of worse quality, and less reliable than data on remittance inflows. Third, most countries report data either on inflows or on outflows, but not on both of them. Therefore, it would be very difficult to calculate precise and meaningful indicators for net remittance flows. One of the major disadvantages of this strategy is that the empirical analysis of remittance flows is limited to the set of developing countries.
Empirical Specification
There are two main issues that I investigate in this study. (∆ log C it − ∆ log C t ) = α + β(∆ log GDP it − ∆ log GDP t ) + it (1) In this equation ∆ log C it is the year-on-year growth rate of real consumption per capita for country i in year t, ∆ log C t is the growth rate for "world" real consumption per capita, ∆ log GDP it and ∆ log GDP t are the corresponding terms for GDP, β measures the average co-movement of the countries' idiosyncratic consumption growth with their idiosyncratic GDP growth during the entire time period, and is the error term.
The slope coefficient β deserves special attention because it measures the (average) deviation from perfect risk-sharing in consumption. In particular, the perfect international risk-sharing in consumption hypothesis states that if the countries manage to share completely the idiosyncratic risks that they face, then this coefficient should not be significantly different from zero. In a corresponding manner, one may argue that 100(1−β)% measures the degree of international risk-sharing in percentage terms.
A similar type of regressions is estimated to measure the effect of workers' remittances in international risk-sharing. In particular, I estimate the following panel regressions: (2) where the slope coefficient is defined as follows:
t is the middle year of the sample period (i.e. 1995 when the sample refers to the period 1990-2000), R it is the ratio between total remittances received and GDP for country i in year t and R t is the average ratio between total 15 The empirical specifications used in this study closely follow Sorensen et al. (2005) .
remittances received and GDP in year t. Therefore, t−t can be thought of as a time trend, which captures the trend decline in consumption smoothing not directly caused by the increase in workers' remittances. Finally, the term
measures the relative importance of the ratio total remittances received to GDP for certain country i in year t compared to its average value across countries in year t.
Defined in this way, each of the coefficients ψ 0 , ψ 1 and ψ 2 has very precise meaning. In particular, 1 − ψ 0 measures the degree of international consumption risk-sharing achieved by country with the "average" ratio between remittances received and GDP during the middle yeart. By similar argument, the coefficient −ψ 1 gives the average year-on-year increase in consumption risk-sharing. If it is true that country-specific risks became better diversified internationally through time, then one will expect a negative sign for ψ 1 . Furthermore, −ψ 2 captures the impact of a higher than average ratio between total remittances received and GDP for a certain country on its ability to smooth idiosyncratic output shocks. Therefore, a significantly negative value for ψ 2 implies better risk-sharing for countries that receive above-average ratio of workers' remittances relative to GDP. Finally, the
measures the amount of consumption risk-sharing achieved by country i in year t.
Results
The estimation results for the panel specification in equation 1 are given in Table 1 . Similar type of equations is estimated for the whole sample and the subsamples of developing and industrial countries during the period 1960-2000. Moreover, each equation has been estimated with fixed effects (assuming non-zero correlation between the regressors and the country-specific part Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% of the error term) and with random effects panel data estimation techniques.
As can be seen in Table 1 , the results obtained using the two alternative estimation techniques do not differ a lot. Moreover, the Hausman test suggests that the difference between coefficients is not significantly different from zero, thereby suggesting that both estimation techniques yield valid results 16 . Table 1 displays several important findings. First, in line with many previous studies the hypothesis of perfect risk-sharing in consumption is rejected for each (sub)sample of countries. Moreover, the results imply large differences across the two groups of countries. In particular, the group of developing countries achieves "relatively" less international risk-sharing com- 16 The columns named RE and FE in the tables refer to random-effects and fixed-effects estimation results, respectively. the slope coefficient of the idiosyncratic output growth term declines in each specification, indicating that the "average" international risk-sharing increases compared to the baseline specification (Table 1 ) and now lies in the range 21.7-26.2% 18 . However, it is still significantly different from zero at any conventional significance level. Moreover, the time trend has a significantly negative slope coefficient, meaning that risk-sharing improved gradually though time. The final and most important finding refers to the "remittances interaction term" which has negative value significant at the 5% significance level 19 . This suggests that countries that receive more than aver-17 The analysis is limited to the this time-period because the data on remittances for the period 1960-1990 is very scarce and available for a small number of countries only. 18 The "average" refers to the country with an average ratio remittances received to GDP during the "middle" year, i.e. 1995 in this case. 19 The results are not driven by non-stationarity of the variables. In fact, the Im, Pesaran, and Shin and Madala and Wu tests both reject the null hypothesis of unit-root at 1% significance level. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% age amount of workers' remittances per year (relative to their GDP) achieve a significantly higher degree of international risk-sharing in consumption 20 .
The analysis goes one step further in Table 3 and Table 4 . The entire set of developing countries is divided into three subgroups: more financially integrated (MFIs), less financially integrated (LFIs), and transition economies. The results are broadly similar to those for the entire set of de-20 The middle two columns in Table 2 use an alternative definition for the remittances interaction term. Instead of average remittances received relative to average GDP, they use total remittances to total GDP. The results stay literally the same, however. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% front of the idiosyncratic output growth rate turns insignificant for the group of transition economies in the fixed-effects specification. This means that the null hypothesis of full international risk-sharing for the group of transition economies, once the time trend and the effect of workers' remittances is accounted for, cannot be rejected at conventional significance levels.
Finally, Table 4 reports estimation results from a specification similar to the one in Table 3 , the sole difference being that an alternative definition can be rejected even at 1% significance level now. The corresponding significance level for the entire set of developing countries was 5%.
for the remittances indicator is used 22 . As can be seen from the Table, the results stay almost literally the same, meaning that the major conclusions with respect to the impact of workers' remittances are not sensitive to the specific definition of the remittances indicator.
Conclusion
During the past four decades, idiosyncratic consumption growth rates have been very strongly correlated with idiosyncratic output growth rates, thereby suggesting that a very small part of macroeconomic risks is actually shared internationally. In this sense, the results presented in this paper are in line with most other empirical studies on international risk-sharing that use macroeconomics data. Various explanations have been proposed for this apparent puzzle in international macroeconomics. In this respect, the reduction in equity home bias has been identified as a crucial channel through which risk-sharing across countries can be improved. This paper offered an alternative risk-sharing channel -workers' remittances sent to their home countries. Moreover, the empirical evidence gave strong support to this alternative channel. Indeed, developing countries with above average remittance receipts during the last decade of the previous century display significantly smaller deviation from the perfect risk-sharing hypothesis. Furthermore, the analysis showed that this effect is not equal for the three groups of developing countries. Clearly, transition economies achieved a reasonably high level of consumption risk-sharing, to a large extent thanks to the 22 As mentioned before, this indicator is defined as total remittances received relative to total GDP, instead of average remittances to average GDP as reported in Table 3 . The main purpose is to see how sensitive the main results are to the exact definition of the remittances indicator.
"smoothing effect" of workers' remittances they received.
Apart from presenting empirical evidence on an alternative risk-sharing channel, this study identified several questions that deserve further research.
First, it is important to find out why the impact of workers' remittances is so different across the three groups of developing countries. In turn, identifying the underlying reasons might give further insight into the broad institutional environment through which workers' remittances arrive to their final beneficiaries. Finally, the increasing trend in remittance inflows might be accompanied by additional private (and/or official) capital flows to developing countries. Thereby, remittance inflows might fundamentally change the entire framework through which these countries diversify their macroeconomic risks.
